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1Abstract
In this article, the impact of common labels is investigated with both theoretical and
empirical approaches. Recent statistics regarding the egg market in France suggest that
retailer brands largely adopt common labels. A simple theoretical framework enables us
to determine the conditions under which producers and/or retailers with different product
qualities decide to post a common label on their products. In particular, a situation of
multiple equilibria (one where the label is used by the high-quality seller only and one
where it is used by the low-quality seller only) is exhibited when the cost of the label is
relatively large. The demand is then estimated for different segments of the French egg
market, including producer/retailer brands with/without common labels. The estimates
are used to derive expenditure and price elasticities and allow us to calculate welfare
measures revealing a relatively large willingness-to-pay for labels.
Keywords: competition, demand estimation, labels, product differentiation.
1 Introduction
Product di¤erentiation and quality/characteristic revelation are now widespread in agri-
cultural markets. While a private brand belongs to a single rm (manufacturer/retailer),
common labels are used by several producers/rms complying with the label rules and/or
having a common characteristic that is not particular to one product. Common labels re-
cently ourished in Europe and in the U.S. (McCluskey and Loureiro, 2003). Consumers
face a plethora of food labels concerning safety, freshness, nutrition, characteristics, ge-
ographic origin, organic status (...), or respect of the environment and fair trade (...),
just to name a few. These characteristics cannot be captured by a single producer/rm,
which leads to complex strategies of common labeling as a tool of promotion.
The common label proliferation may lead to confusion among consumers regarding
the label signication (Crespi and Marette, 2003). For example, Loisel and Couvreur
(2001) show that in France o¢ cial signals of quality are not clear to many consumers.
The recognition of quality labels by French consumers is only 43% for Label Rouge
(supposed to indicate a high level of quality), 18% for Agriculture Biologique (organic)
and only 12% for Appellations dOrigine Contrôlée (geographic indications). One major
problem is simply the legibility and clarity of a label, especially one showing some o¢ cial
seal. Although Label Rouge is a well-established label, which suggests that reputation
matters, the fact that less than half of French consumers recognize it is suggestive of the
problems inherent in any label. This raises the issue of the e¤ects of common labels on
consumerswillingness-to-pay and market prices. The price di¤erence between products
with and without labels is one possible (and imperfect) indicator that may be used for
measuring the quality perception of consumers and the label reputation.
As the following empirical examples suggest, there is no simple conclusion regarding
the impact of labels on market mechanisms. For instance, premium and market valuation
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of environmental attributes have been estimated by numerous papers, including Blend
and van Ravenswaay (1999), Nimon and Beghin (1999), Teisl et al. (1999), and Loureiro
et al. (2001). In general, these studies show that while very few consumers are ready to
pay more than 5-10% more compared to the price of a standard product, the niche eco
market is likely a stable one even if it is small.
Another complex example is the role of geographic indications that Hayes and Lence
(2005, p. 1) consider as the only market based solution to the U.S. rural development
problem that we are aware of.1 Loureiro and McCluskey (2000) show that the label of
origin for fresh meat in Spain leads to price premia for medium quality. Roosen et al.
(2003) also suggest that consumers place more importance on labels of origin as opposed
to private brands for beef, although this study is applied to European consumers facing
the mad cow disease, for which regional labels take on a highly signicant meaning.2
Hassan and Monier (2004) show that various labels matter to French consumers. Based
on a hedonic approach, they exhibit a signicant price premium for French o¢ cial la-
bels such as Label Rouge, organic appellation or geographic indications, with a higher
premium for retailer brands than for producer brands. Conversely, Bonnet and Simioni
(1999) show that French consumers do not value the quality signal provided by the Pro-
tected Designation of Origin for Camembert cheese. In this particular case, the brand
appears to be the relevant signal.3
1Even if indications of origin are less used in the U.S. than in Europe, U.S. farmers are also concerned
by this tool. In the U.S., it is possible to mention the Washington Apple Label, the Arizona Grown Label,
or the Food Alliance Label for Sustainable Agriculture (...) (McCluskey and Loureiro, 2003), while beef
producers in Iowa try to develop the Iowa-80 label (Hayes and Lence, 2002, and Hayes et al., 2004).
2Enneking (2004) shows that safety labeling signicantly inuences consumers willingness-to-pay for
meat.
3Wine is a good example of the appellation proliferation. Peri and Gaeta (1999) provide interesting
statistics about the number of (voluntary) labels and appellations in Europe indicating that such a
proliferation may be a reality. For instance, they count more than 400 o¢ cial appellations in the wine
sector in Italy alone, a profusion that insures the product diversity but certainly increases the buyers
confusion (see Consumer Reports, 1997). Indeed, wine producers in Australia, California, Chile, and
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The results of these previous contributions highlight the complexity of market mech-
anisms. However, some questions often remain overlooked in this literature. First, who
does adopt a common label? Second, what is the consumerswillingness-to-pay for a
common label, conditioning its adoption by one or several rms? This article aims at
replying to these questions and leads to the following results.
First, some empirical facts regarding the egg market in France are analyzed. The
statistics show that the market share of retailer brands with labels largely increased
between 1996 and 2002. As, to a lesser extent, the market share of producer brands
with common labels also increased, we turn to a theoretical model that enables us
to understand both incentives and strategic interactions among producers/retailers for
using a common label.
Second, a simple framework allows us to determine the conditions under which sellers
with di¤erent product qualities (representing the di¤erences between producer and re-
tailer brands) decide to post a common label on their products. The complex interactions
between common labeling and competition are emphasized. In particular, a situation of
multiple equilibria (one where the label is used by the high-quality seller only and one
where it is used by the low-quality seller only) is exhibited when the cost of the label is
relatively large. We then turn to an econometric analysis that is useful for quantifying
the value that consumers are ready to pay for a label.
Third, we estimate the demand for di¤erent segments of the French egg market,
including producer/retailer brands with/without common labels. The estimates are used
to derive expenditure and price elasticities, and allow us to calculate welfare measures
(see Banks et al., 1996). We show that expenditure and price elasticities for segments
delineated by the presence or the absence of labels are both statistically signicant and
di¤erent from one another. Eventually, a relatively large willingness-to-pay for labels is
exhibited from the computation of equivalent variations. The equivalent variation is a
other emerging wine producing countries are challenging the Appellation of Origin European leadership
in world markets (Marsh, 2003).
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more complete measure than the consumerspremium for labeled products compared to
products without any sign (as proposed in numerous papers), since it takes into account
both consumerspreferences and substitutions among various qualities. All these results
suggest that information and labels matter to French consumers and explain the price
di¤erentiation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and some empirical
facts regarding the egg market in France. Section 3 develops the theoretical framework
detailing the common label adoption by producer(s). In section 4, the demand for eggs
in France is estimated. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Egg Market in France
This section introduces some empirical facts characterizing the egg market in France.
Before reporting some descriptive statistics, the data (also used in section 4) are pre-
sented.
The data we use are drawn from the 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2002 issues of a French
survey conducted by the Société dEtude de la Consommation, Distribution et Publicité
(SECODIP). This survey contains detailed information on the attributes of households
living in France and on their purchase behavior regarding various consumption goods,
including numerous food products.4 Each issue provides, over the whole year, a de-
scription of the main characteristics of the goods, the purchased quantities and the
corresponding expenditures. Unit prices are computed as the ratio of expenditures on
purchased quantities (namely, the number of eggs).
Respectively to the 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2002 issues, our four initial samples contain
3381, 4355, 5255 and 5362 households. We focus on households that are consumers of
eggs sold in boxes. We aggregate weekly or daily expenditures by quarters in order to
4The sample only considers households of the 21 regions in metropolitan France without taking into
account (i) those living in Corsica and Frances overseas departments and territories, and (ii) single
men for the 1993 sample only.
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avoid the problem of purchase infrequency. After the exclusion of eggs sold in bulk,
and the deletion of incomplete records and of households who did not buy eggs in boxes
during a quarter, we end up with nal samples containing respectively 1704, 2511, 3007
and 3072 households, and 6816, 10044, 12028 and 12288 observations (coming from per-
quarter aggregate values). Observations are then classied and aggregated according to
whether or not a brand and/or a common label are observed. We distinguish between
producer (or manufacturer) brands and retailer brands. The selected characteristics
referring to common labels for eggs are organic, farm (namely, eggs coming from a free-
range layer) or open air characteristics, along with eggs for which the laying date is
clearly indicated.5
Eventually, observations are regrouped into ve categories or segments: Producer
Brand with a Label (PBL), Retailer Brand with a Label (RBL), Producer Brand with
No Label (PBNL), Retailer Brand with No Label (RBNL), and No Brand No Label
(NBNL).6 The number of distinct products composing each of these ve segments is
given in table 1. In 1996, labels concerned less than 30% of the total number of distinct
products observed in the data versus more than 37% in 2002. One explanation of the
label attraction is the price di¤erence between products with and without labels. Figure
1 reports the evolution of average-unit prices (in euro) over the period.
Figure 1 indicates that eggs are more expensive when they are sold under a producer
brand rather than a retailer brand. Prices are higher for eggs with common labels than
for eggs without labels, the gap becoming more important over the end of the decade.
Average prices increased from at least 3 cents for products with common labels (from
0.19 and 0.16 in 1993 to 0.23 and 0.19 in 2002 for producer and retailer brands, respec-
tively), while they remained almost constant for the others. Clearly, there is a premium
5The laying date is considered as a common label since it is voluntary information that depends
on a producers choice. This di¤ers from the use-by date that is mandatory information provided to
consumers.
6The sixth group of eggs with a label and without brand is not taken into account because of the
very small number of observations.
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associated with common labels for both producer and retailer brands. This premium is
larger for producer brands than for retailer brands.7 In 2002, the per-unit premium in-
duced by labels is 0:23 0:15 = 0:08 euro for producer brands and 0:19 0:14 = 0:05 euro
for retailer brands. Given that the number of eggs with labels purchased by a household
over a whole year is on average 33 for producer brands and 67 for retailer brands in 2002,
the per-year value generated in 2002 by labels is on average 33  0:08 + 67  0:05 = 6
euros per household.
The evolution of the cumulated average budget shares between 1993 and 2002 is
presented in gure 2. The budget share of eggs with common labels increased from
less than 20% in 1993 to more than 50% in 2002. This increase mainly comes from the
development of retailer brands with labels. Figures 1 and 2 clearly show that common
labels lead to better prices and market shares. These two gures suggest that labels
matter for market segmentation and competition among producers.
The point at issue is to determine why retailers (and, to a lower extent, producers)
largely adopt common labels. The following section helps to reply to this question by
giving clues about the strategic interactions between sellers for joining a common label.
For simplicity, the theoretical model imposes two simplifying assumptions compared
to the previous description of the egg market. First, we consider only one producer
with high-quality products and one producer with low-quality products. As, in gure
1, eggs are more expensive when they are sold under a producer brand rather than
a retailer brand; the high-quality producer represents a producer brand while the low-
quality producer represents a retailer brand. Second, we introduce a single common label
available for both producers, while several common labels coexist on the egg market.
Despite these simplifying assumptions, we believe that the theoretical framework brings
about interesting insights.
7This result di¤ers from the results provided by Hassan and Monier (2004).
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3 A Simple Model of Common Labeling
The classical models of product di¤erentiation do not pay attention to the role of a
common characteristic/label that can be used by one or several producers. This section
underscores the complexity of the strategic interactions related to common labeling
between two producers o¤ering di¤erent qualities.
3.1 Theoretical Framework
Our model is a simple but useful framework allowing for various extensions. Trade occurs
in a single period, with one producer o¤ering high-quality products and one producer
o¤ering low-quality products. Let kh and k` respectively denote the specic level of high
and low quality with kh  k`. We assume that the production cost is the same for every
producer and is equal to zero for simplicity. Each producer may also choose whether or
not to post a common label signaling a characteristic s. It is assumed that only a single
common label is able to provide credible and perfect information about the presence of
the characteristic s to consumers.8 Each producer incurs a xed cost C for the choice
of the common characteristic signaled by the common label.9 The xed cost comprises
the producers e¤ort necessary for complying with the label requirements along with
the cost of the certication process that perfectly signals the characteristic s. The value
Ii = 1 corresponds to the decision by the producer with products of quality i to select
the common characteristic s; while the value Ii = 0 corresponds to the opposite decision.
The specic quality of each commodity kh and k` (related to a brand reputation) and
the choice Ii regarding the common characteristic s validated by the common label are
perfectly known to all sellers and buyers when prices and purchasing decisions are taken.
Buyers want to purchase only one unit of the good (see Mussa and Rosen, 1978). For
8For simplicity, we voluntary abstract from the label proliferation that may lead to confusion among
consumers.
9Marette et al. (1999) and Crespi and Marette (2001) detail the organization of the certication
process that provides information to consumers.
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a buyer, the indirect utility is equal to kh+hIhs ph for the purchase of a high-quality
unit and to k`+`I`s p` for the purchase of a low-quality unit. In this indirect utility,
ph and p` are the respective prices of high- and low-quality products. Regarding specic
qualities kh and k`, buyers di¤er in tastes which are described by a uniformly distributed
parameter  2 [0; 1]. The taste parameters for the common label are h for high-quality
products and ` for low-quality products. For the sake of simplicity and without loss of
generality, the mass of consumers is normalized to unity:
A two-stage oligopoly model is considered. In stage 1, each producer chooses either
to adhere to the common label (Ii = 1), or to avoid the common label (Ii = 0). In
stage 2, the two producers simultaneously select a price (i.e., Bertrand competition)
and buyers purchase units. In this model, producersdecisions are solved by backward
induction (i.e., subgame perfect Nash equilibrium). When a producer adheres to the
common label, it takes into account the way the other producer adjusts its common
labeling and price decisions.
3.2 Producersdecisions
The Bertrand-price equilibrium (in stage 2) is detailed in the appendix. In stage 1, the
incentive for a producer to join the common label and to certify the presence of the
characteristic s balances two opposite e¤ects. The common label leads to a better price
for a producer via an increase of the consumerswillingness-to-pay depending on the
value of s. However, this positive e¤ect may be o¤set by the xed cost C induced by the
common label. The complex e¤ects coming from the choice of joining a common label in
a competitive context are now presented. The incentives and the resulting equilibrium
in stage 1 are also detailed in the appendix.
The following proposition asserts when the producer of high-quality products and/or
the producer of low-quality products individually join the common label. Figure 3 illus-
trates the market equilibria detailed in proposition 1, where the X-axis represents the
characteristic s signaled by the common label and the Y-axis represents the certication
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cost C. The relative values of s and C determine the sellersoptimal strategy and dene
the limits of areas 1 to 5 (the frontiers of these regions are detailed in the appendix).
First, it is assumed that h < ` in gure 3, which means that consumers have a higher
willingness-to-pay for the common label posted on low-quality products than for the
one posted on high-quality products. Below, we present the proposition and provide an
intuitive interpretation, leaving the mathematical proof in the appendix.
Proposition 1: The common label is
(a) not selected in area 1,
(b) selected by the producer of high-quality products in area 2,
(c) selected by both producers whatever the quality of the products in area 3,
(d) selected either by the producer of high-quality products or by the producer of low-
quality products in area 4. There is a multiplicity of equilibria, namely two possible
equilibria,
(e) selected by the producer of low-quality products in area 5 and 5.
Proof is given in the appendix.
The certication cost C compared with the marginal gains to use common labels
determines the producers incentives. When the cost C is relatively large compared
to the common characteristic s, the absence of common labeling for all producers is
optimal. This is the case in region 1 where prots are augmented simply by avoiding
the common label. Unlike region 1, in regions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 5as the characteristic s
increases, the common label is attractive because the cost C is now a¤ordable. Notice
that the frontier for region 1 is positively sloped with the trade-o¤ between a higher cost
and a higher characteristic s leading to a higher willingness-to-pay and higher prots.
In regions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 5, at least one producer chooses the common label since
a relatively large characteristic s provides a su¢ cient incentive. As producers are het-
erogeneous in their prots due to their quality di¤erences kh and k`, the incentives for
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using the common label are di¤erent. For a same label strategy (Ih = I`), the prot
with high-quality products is higher than the prot with low-quality products. In region
2, only the producer of high-quality units uses the common label, since a relatively large
prot allows the producer to incur a relatively medium cost C compared to the charac-
teristic s: The producer of low-quality products does not obtain enough prot to cover
the cost. In area 3, the cost C is relatively low, which explains why the competitive
pressure leads both sellers to use the common label. Competition and common label
are compatible in area 3.
In area 4, both producers are interested in using the common label since s is relatively
large. However, the relatively large cost C compared to the prots only allows its use by
one producer. This results in multiple equilibria, one where the label is adopted by the
producer of high-quality products only and one where it is adopted by the producer of
low-quality products only. In areas 5 and 5, only the producer of low-quality products
uses the common label.10 This result only holds for h < `, which means that consumers
have a higher willingness-to-pay for the common label posted on low-quality products
than for the one posted on high-quality products. As the yield is larger for low-quality
products than for high-quality products, only the low-quality producer has the incentive
to cover the xed cost C. Areas 5 and 5disappear when h = `, which is the case in
gure 4.
A comparative-static analysis may provide a clue about the decision(s) sensitivity
concerning certain parameter shifts. As the parameter h increases, frontiers C1 and
C3 move apart while frontiers C2 and C4 move closer (explaining the di¤erence between
gures 3 and 4): region 2 becomes wider, region 4 becomes smaller and shifts towards
the East, and regions 5 and 5disappear as in gure 4. When h is much larger than
`, area 4 disappears from gure 4.
Despite simplifying assumptions, the interesting insights of gures 3 and 4 provide
10This result is relatively close to the one presented by Hollander et al. (1999) under di¤erent assump-
tions. Note that it is limited to areas 5 and 5in gure 3.
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partial explanations for understanding the complex incentives suggested by the inter-
pretation of gure 2. When the cost C is relatively large, the number of producers that
may use the common label is limited. Recall from the previous section that we assumed
a high-quality producer representing a producer brand and a low-quality producer rep-
resenting a retailer brand. The analysis can be easily extended to nh high-quality (pro-
ducer) brands and n` low-quality (retailer) brands under a Cournot competition. The
larger the number of sellers on one quality segment, the lower the incentive for using
the common label since the prots are low compared to the xed cost C. However, a
decrease of C and/or an increase of ` may help to explain the increase of the budget
share of retailer brands with a label (RBL) from 1993 to 2002 in gure 2.
In dening the analytical framework, very restrictive assumptions were made. The
case with a very large s could lead to the elimination of products without common la-
beling. The basic model could be extended to di¤erential marginal costs reecting the
two quality levels, and then to several di¤erent levels of quality. Future analysis could
also extend this model to allow for the case where buyers have imperfect information
about the characteristic s due to imperfect certication, or to the case of quality choice
(kh, k` or s) under imperfect information where sellers may try to avoid or discourage
quality improvements or common labeling. We abstracted from the consumerspref-
erences and surplus. However, the following section considers them for computing the
willingness-to-pay for a common label.
4 An Empirical Estimation for Measuring Market E¤ects
and Label Value
The empirical estimation completes the previous theoretical model for understanding
market mechanisms. We now turn to the description of the methodology.
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4.1 Methodology
The demand model that we estimate is the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System
(QUAIDS) introduced by Banks et al. (1997). In this model the budget share whi on
good i = 1; :::; N for household h = 1; :::;H with log total expenditure xh and the log
price N -vector ph is given by
whi = i + 
0
ip
h + i(x
h   a(ph; )) + i (x
h   a(ph; ))2
b(ph; )
+ "hi ; (1)
with the following non-linear price aggregators:
a(ph; ) = 0ph +
1
2
ph0 ph;
b(ph; ) = exp(0ph);
where  = (1; :::; N )0,  = (1; :::; N )0,   = (1; :::; N )0,  is the set of all parameters,
and "hi is an error term. Householdsheterogeneity enters the system through the s,
which are modelled as linear combinations of some observed socio-demographic variables.
These variables are the number of persons living in the household, the age of the head,
and dummy variables indicating the socio-economic status of the head, the presence of
a child of less than 16 years old and the presence of at least one car. Seasonal dummies
are also introduced.
An attractive feature of the model described in (1) is to be conditionally linear
in price aggregators. Estimation using the iterated moment estimator developed in
Blundell and Robin (1999) is therefore straightforward. This estimator consists of the
following series of iterations: for given values of price aggregators, estimate the para-
meters by a linear moment estimator, use these estimates to update price aggregators
and continue the iteration until numerical convergence occurs. Additivity and homo-
geneity constraints are imposed within the iterative process, and symmetry restricted
parameters are obtained in a second stage using a minimum distance estimator. The
endogeneity of total expenditure is controlled for by means of instrumental variables
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and augmented regression techniques, using households income as an instrument. The
model is estimated on each dataset separately.11
One of the main motivations for estimating demand systems is to derive expenditure
and price elasticities. But parameter estimates can also be used to calculate welfare mea-
sures (see Banks et al., 1996), in particular regarding some product characteristics such
as labels. Two simple welfare measures are given by the compensating and equivalent
variations (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, for example). Although these measures
are not strictly identical, except in the very special case of quasi-linear preferences, they
are not strongly di¤erent either. In this article, we focus on the latter. The equivalent
variation is the maximum amount a household would be prepared to pay before a price
increase in order to be as well o¤ as it would be after the price increase. In other words,
it measures the maximum amount a household would be willing to pay to avoid the
price change.
Formally, let xh = c(uh; ph) be the cost or expenditure function, which denes the
total expenditure level required by household h to obtain the utility level uh. The
equivalent variation for h is given by c(uh2 ; p
h
2)  c(uh2 ; ph1), where ph1 is the current price
vector faced by the household, ph2 is the price vector that set to zero its demand for
the goods endowed with the characteristic under consideration (namely, the eggs with
labels), and uh2 is the utility level it would obtain if it was no longer a consumer of these
goods, that is if ph = ph2 . Given that the indirect utility function for the QUAIDS model
is of the form
ln vh =
"
xh   a(ph; )
b(ph; )
 1
+ (ph; )
# 1
; (2)
with (ph; ) = 0ph, where  = (1; :::; N )0, and since c(vh2 ; ph2) = c(vh1 ; ph1) = xh1 is
known, the computation of the equivalent variation only requires determining ph2 , which
then can be introduced in (2) to obtain vh2 = v(x
h
1 ; p
h
2) and x
h
2 = c(v
h
2 ; p
h
1).
11A full account of the estimation results is available on request from the authors.
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4.2 Results for the Egg Market in France
The methodology is applied to the egg market in France, with the data presented in
section 2. Using the demand estimates we derive (egg) expenditure and uncompensated
own-price elasticities, evaluated at the sample mean point of householdsincome distri-
bution.12 All are statistically signicant at the 5% level, except (egg) budget elasticities
for producer and retailer brands with labels in 1993 and 1996 and for retailer brands
without labels in 1999. Figures 5 and 6 report their evolution over the period. Figure
5 shows an overall increase in budget elasticities for eggs with labels (from 0.09 and
0.37 in 1993 to 1.29 and 1.85 in 2002 for producer and retailer brands respectively), and
an almost symmetrical decrease for eggs without labels (from 1.33 to 0.45 for producer
brands over the whole period, and from 2.30 in 1996 to 0.92 in 2002 for retailer brands).
These two opposite trends are strong enough to lead to a reversal in the magnitude
of expenditure elasticities: the demands for labels were the least sensitive to budget
changes in 1993 but the most sensitive in 2002, the reversal occurring between 1999 and
2002.
Figure 6 indicates signicant changes in the price sensitivity. The uncompensated
own-price elasticity decreased by almost 0.6 point between 1993 and 2002 (from 1.35 to
0.77) for producer brands with labels and increased by 0.5 point (from 0.93 to 1.44) for
retailer brands with labels, whereas values for the other groups were quite stable. This
result sharply contrasts with the overall stability that can be observed when eggs are
considered as an aggregate, since in this case values only range from  0.77 in 1993 to
 0.68 in 2002. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the evolution of own-price elasticities
from 1996 looks very similar (despite some di¤erences) for producer and retailer eggs
with labels on one hand, and for producer and retailer eggs without labels on the other
hand. As this gure is also observed in the case of expenditure elasticities, it suggests
that segments delimited by the presence or the absence of labels are relevant competing
12Uncompensated cross-price elasticities are also computed but they are not presented here. Many
are signicant and all are reasonable.
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segments on the French egg market.
The average equivalent variation for labels and the quartiles of its distribution are
presented in gure 7. Since our data are quarterly, the equivalent variation gives the
maximum additional amount a household is willing to pay per quarter for eggs with
quality labels compared to eggs without labels.13 The average equivalent variation for
labels increased from 2 euros in 1993 (on average about 30% of the budget for eggs
in the same year) to more than 9 euros in 1996 (near 100% of the budget), and then
remained stable until 2002. This seems to suggest an upper bound for the maximum
willingness-to-pay for eggs with labels. Despite this upper bound, values are relatively
large compared to the gures provided by the literature.
The values obtained for consumers in quartile Q1 and consumers in quartile Q3 reveal
a large di¤erence in the maximum willingness-to-pay after 1996. An examination of the
composition of each quartile shows that households in quartile Q3 are those that spend
the most on eggs and have the largest income. The increase of equivalent variations in
1996 could be explained by the mad cow disease crisis that occured in February 1996
(Adda, 2001), leading consumers to ask for more details and information regarding the
products.
To make sure that previous results are not driven by the way we dened segments,
we searched for more details about the type of labels and the demand estimates we used
to compute the consumers surplus. From the 2002 data, it is possible to distinguish
between two di¤erent quality labels, namely, the organic and the farm labels (i.e., eggs
coming from a free-range layer). Therefore we can disaggregate the single label indicator
that we used above and construct three groups of eggs: organic, farm and regular. Eggs
for which the laying date is the only available indication are now considered as regular
eggs and are grouped together with eggs without any label. Moreover, no distinction
is made between brands in order to keep a reasonable number of observations in each
13Notice that substitutions between segments are accounted for in the computation of equivalent
variations.
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group. Average budget shares are 0.05 for organic eggs, 0.12 for farm eggs and 0.83 for
regular eggs. Estimating model (1) and computing elasticities, we nd that expenditure
elasticies are 1.98 for organic eggs, 1.49 for farm eggs, and 0.85 for regular eggs, and
that uncompensated own-price elasticities are  0.95 for organic eggs,  1.44 for farm
eggs, and  0.98 for regular eggs. These values are close to those reported for 2002 in
gures 5 and 6.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that the conguration of the egg market in France regarding
common labels changed between 1993 and 2002. Recent statistics give evidence that the
market share of retailer brands with labels and, to a lesser extent, the one of producer
brands with labels largely increased between 1996 and 2002. This fact raises the issue
of the sharing of the label benets between retailers and farmers, which clearly deserves
more attention in future studies.
A simple theoretical framework enabled us to understand the strategic interactions
among producers for using a common label and to determine the conditions under which
sellers with di¤erent product qualities decide to post a common label on their products.
We then turned to an econometric analysis where demand was estimated for di¤erent
segments of the French egg market. The estimates were used to derive expenditure and
price elasticities and allowed us to calculate the value that consumers are ready to pay
for labels. We showed that expenditure and price elasticities for segments dened by
the presence or the absence of labels are both statistically signicant and di¤erent from
one another. A relatively large willingness-to-pay for labels was exhibited from the
computation of equivalent variations. All these results suggest that information and
labels matter to French consumers and explain the price di¤erentiation.
The methodology is useful for (i) a producer board in charge of industry self-
regulation looking for a better understanding of market mechanisms under common
17
labels, and/or (ii) a regulator attempting to monitor the use of labels in a context of
label proliferation. Beyond our egg example, our ndings might be relevant for vari-
ous markets and/or countries. However, market mechanisms are complex and possibly
market-specic, and the methodology should be replicated before asserting anything
about other products using common labels.
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Appendix
Consumersdemand and sellersprots are presented before detailing the proof of propo-
sition 1.
The consumer with utility k` + `I`s   p` = 0 is indi¤erent between buying and
not buying a low-quality product, implying that his taste parameter e = p` `I`sk` . The
consumer implicit in kh + hIhs  ph = k` + `I`s  p` is indi¤erent between buying
high-quality and buying low-quality, yielding a taste parameter b = ph p`+s(`I` hIh)kh k` .
As the distribution of preferences is uniform, the demand for high-quality products is
Qh = 1  b and the demand for low-quality products is Q` = b   e.
In stage 2, each producer chooses a level of price, taking into account the price of
the other producer. The prot for the high-quality seller is h = phQh   IhC and the
prot for the low-quality seller is ` = p`Q`   I`C. The rst order conditions for the
maximization of h with respect to ph (namely, @h=@ph = 0) and ` with respect to p`
(namely, @`=@p` = 0) lead to equilibrium prices ph and p

` . The substitution of these
equilibrium prices into h and ` leads to the following respective prots for the seller
of high-quality products and for the seller of low-quality products:
h(Ih; I`) =
[kh (2kh + s(2hIh   `I`))  k`(2kh + shIh)]2
(4kh   k`)2(kh   k`)   IhC; (3)
`(Ih; I`) =
kh

2kh`I`s  k2` + k`(kh   s(hIh + `I`))
2
k`(4kh   k`)2(kh   k`)   I`C: (4)
The decision to use the common label in stage 1 depends on these prots. In gures
3 and 4, we assume that ph > p

` under I` = 1 and Ih = 0. We also assume that
both qualities are always sold. In particular, this is the case for I` = 0 and Ih = 1, if
Q` = b   e > 0, which is the case for s < (kh   k`)=h.
In stage 1, each producer faces the following decision: (i) join the common label
(Ii = 1) and incur the cost C, or (ii) avoid the common label (Ii = 0). For the
high-quality producer, the decision depends on the comparison between h(1; I`) that
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denotes the prot under the common label, and h(0; I`) that denotes the prot under
the absence of common labeling. For the low-quality producer, the decision depends on
the comparison between `(Ih; 1) that denotes the prot under the common label, and
`(Ih; 0) that denotes the prot under the absence of common labeling. We now turn to
the equilibrium strategies that lead to proposition 1.
Proof of proposition 1.
The di¤erent areas of gure 3 correspond to one or two congurations of equilibrium.
We now present the di¤erent congurations.
(a) No producer uses the common label when
h(1; 0) < h(0; 0); (5)
and `(0; 1) < `(0; 0): (6)
Using (3) and (4), this system is satised in area 1 of gure 3 where
C > C1 =
[2kh (kh + sh)  k`(2kh + sh)]2  

2k2h   2khk`
2
(4kh   k`)2(kh   k`) ;
and C > C2 = kh

2kh`s  k2` + k`(kh   s`)
2   k`kh   k2` 2
k`(4kh   k`)2(kh   k`) :
(b) The producer of high-quality products uses the common label when
h(1; 0)  h(0; 0); (7)
and `(1; 1) < `(1; 0): (8)
Using (3) and (4), this system is satised in areas 1 and 4 of gure 3 where
C  C1;
and C > C3 = kh

2kh`s  k2` + k`(kh   s(h + `))
2   k`(kh   sh)  k2` 2
k`(4kh   k`)2(kh   k`) :
(c) Both producers use the common label when
h(1; 1)  h(0; 1); (9)
and `(1; 1)  `(1; 0): (10)
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Using (3) and (4), this system is satised in area 3 of gure 3 where
C < C4 =
[kh (2kh + s(2h   `))  k`(2kh + sh)]2   [kh(2kh   s`   2k`)]2
(4kh   k`)2(kh   k`) ;
and C < C3:
(e) The producer of low-quality products uses the common label when
h(1; 1) < h(0; 1); (11)
and `(0; 1) > `(0; 0): (12)
Using (3) and (4), this system is satised in areas 4, 5, and 5of gure 3 where
C > C4;
and C < C2:
(d) In area 4, two equilibria exist simultaneously, one in which only the producer of
high-quality products uses the common label (namely, conditions (7) and (8) hold) and
one in which only the producer of low-quality products uses the common label (namely,
conditions (11) and (12) hold).
The di¤erence between gure 3 and gure 4 comes from the relative values of h and
`. When h < `, it is easy to show that C2 > C1 and C3 > C4, which leads to the
existence of areas 5 and 5(gure 3). When h = `, it is easy to show that C2 < C1
and C3 < C4, which leads to the absence of areas 5 and 5(gure 4). When h > `, it
is easy to show that C2 < C4, which leads to the absence of area 4 (and areas 5 and 5),
a situation that is not represented in this paper.

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Table 1. Number of distinct products
1993 1996 1999 2002
PBL NA 84 101 104
RBL NA 20 28 31
PBNL NA 255 211 174
RBNL NA 31 24 20
NBNL NA 52 41 30
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Figure 1. Average unit prices (euros)
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Figure 2. Cumulated budget shares
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Figure 5. Expenditure elasticities
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Figure 6. Own-price elasticities (absolute values)
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Figure 7. Equivalent variation for labels (euros)
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